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Abstract
A group of N individuals must choose between two collective alternatives.
Under Quadratic Voting (QV), agents buy votes in favor of their preferred
alternative from a clearing house, paying the square of the number of votes
purchased, and the sum of all votes purchased determines the outcome. Each
agent is assumed to have a private value that determines her utility; these
values are assigned by simple random sampling from a probability distribution
F with a smooth density on a compact interval [u, u]. Under these assumptions,
the structure of the Bayes-Nash equilibrium is described when N is large. The
results imply that the quadratic voting mechanism is asymptotically efficient.
Keywords: social choice, collective decisions, large markets, costly voting, vote
trading, Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
1 Introduction and Main Results
Consider a binary collective-decision problem in which a group of N individuals
must choose between two alternatives. Each individual i has a privately known
value ui that determines her willingness to pay for one alternative over the other;
positive values indicate affinity for outcome +1, negative values for outcome −1.
Quadratic Voting (QV) is a simple and detail-free mechanism designed to maximize
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utilitarian efficiency in this setting.1 In this system, individuals buy votes (either
negative or positive, depending on which alternative is favored) from a clearing
house, paying the square of the number of votes purchased. The sum of all votes
purchased then determines the outcome. The utility (payoff) of the outcome to
an individual with value u is +u if outcome + is adopted, but −u if outcome − is
adopted.2
The heuristic rationale for QV is quite simple. The marginal benefit to a voter
of an additional vote is her value multiplied by her marginal pivotality (roughly, the
perceived probability that an additional unit of vote will sway the decision). She
maximizes utility by equating this marginal utility to the linear marginal cost of a
vote. Therefore, if voters share the same marginal pivotality, they will buy votes in
proportion to their values, thus bringing about utilitarian efficiency. Furthermore,
the quadratic cost function is the unique cost function with this property. This
argument is explained in further detail in Subsection 1.3.
Variations of this rationale have been used to justify quadratic mechanisms in
a number of related collective-decision-making problems. However, to our knowl-
edge, this heuristic rationale has never been translated into a rigorous argument
for efficiency in the sort of non-cooperative, incomplete information game theoretic
model in which mechanisms for allocating private goods have been studied at least
since the work of Myerson [11]. In fact, as we will show, in the modified setting
of quadratic voting that we will consider the crucial ansatz of this rationale – that
in equilibrium all voters will have the same marginal pivotality – is false. As a
result, formal equilibrium analysis is a far more subtle task than the heuristic argu-
ment of the previous paragraph might suggest. Nevertheless, we will show that
for voters with values in the “bulk” of the distribution, the marginal pivotality is
approximately constant.3
To our knowledge the use of quadratic pricing for collective decision-making
was first suggested by Groves and Ledyard [6], who proposed it as a Nash im-
plementation of the optimal level of continuous public goods under complete in-
formation that avoids the fragility of previously suggested efficient mechanisms.
Hylland and Zeckhauser [8] provided the first variant of the heuristic rationale
above to uniquely justify quadratic pricing mechanism and proposed an iterative
1Clearly many other objectives are possible for this problem, and many involve distributional
considerations. However, we focus on a utilitarian objective because it is the one most extensively
studied in the literature [2, 5].
2Our results will apply to a modified version of the problem in which the utility is “smoothed”
in such a way that each voter’s utility is a continuous function of the vote total. See section 1.1 for
details.
3Theorems of Kahn et al. [9] and Al-Najjar et al. [1] imply marginal pivotality must converge to
zero as N →∞. Our results will show that, with probability approaching 1, the ratio between the
marginal pivotalities of two randomly chosen voters will be close to 1.
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procedure that they conjectured would converge to [6]’s complete information op-
timum in the presence of private information. In a previous version of this paper,
Weyl [13] first proposed the use of QV for binary collective decision problems,
and conjectured that it would lead to asymptotically efficient decisions in the en-
vironment we consider based on an (independently discovered) extension of [8]’s
heuristic rationale. Goeree and Zhang [4] independently suggested using a detail-
based, approximately direct variant of QV in the special case where values are
sampled from zero-mean normal distributions, and derived an equilibrium in the
case N = 2.
1.1 Model Assumptions
We consider an independent symmetric private values environment with N voters
i = 1, . . . , N . Each voter i is characterized by a value, ui; these values are drawn
independently from a continuous probability distribution F with C∞, strictly posi-
tive density f supported by a finite closed interval [u, u].4 Each individual knows
her own value, but not the values of any of the otherN−1 voters; however, the sam-
pling distribution F is known to all. For normalization, we assume the numeraire
has been scaled so that min(−u, u) ≥ 1. We denote by µ, σ2, and µ3, respectively,
respectively the mean, variance, and raw third moments of u under F .
We consider a variant of the payoff described above, in which the utility of the
outcome is “smoothed”. 5 Each voter i chooses a number of votes vi ∈ R to buy,
and pays v2i dollars for these. The payoff to voter i is then
Ψ(V )ui, where V =
N∑
i=1
vi (1)
is the vote total and Ψ : R → [−1, 1] is an odd, nondecreasing, C∞ function such
4The assumption that the density f is positive at the endpoints u, u is of critical importance for
our main results, as “extremists” play a crucial role in the Bayes-Nash equilibria for the game. Our
methods would extend to densities f that vanish at one or both of the endpoints, but the nature of
the Bayes-Nash equilibria changes in these cases.
5Although both the discrete binary choice set-up of [13] and the continuous public goods model
of [8] helped inspire this model, it differs from both. Consequently, our results have no direct
implications for those models. It differs from [13]’s model in that the outcome is smoothed rather
than jumping discontinuously at 0. It differs in a variety of respects from [8]’s, notably in that utility
is linear in the common and bounded outcome, whereas [8] assume strictly concave preferences
with heterogeneous ideal points and an outcome that may take values in the full real space. [8] also
consider a multidimensional issue space with no access to transfers and an iterative procedure to
converge to this outcome, none of which feature in our model.
3
that for some δ > 0,
Ψ(x) = sgn(x) for all |x| ≥ δ; (2)
ψ(x) := Ψ′(x) > 0 for all x ∈ (−δ, δ); (3)
ψ′(x) > 0 for all x ∈ (−δ, 0); and (4)
ψ has a single inflection point in (−δ, 0). (5)
We shall refer to Ψ as the payoff function, because it determines the quantity by which
values ui are multiplied to obtain the allocative component of each individual’s
utility.6 Conditional on the values {vi}, individual i earns expected utility
Ψ(V )ui − v2i . (6)
Thus, in a type-symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium7, a voter with value uwill maximize
E [uΨ (V−1 + v)]− v2, (7)
where V−1 :=
∑
i 6=1 vi is the one-out vote total, the sum of all votes cast by all but a
single individual. For notational convenience we will henceforth write n = N − 1
for the number of voters minus one and Sn = V−1 for the vote total of the first n
voters. For brevity, we shall refer to type-symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibria as Nash
equilibria.
We define the expected inefficiency as
EI ≡ 1
2
− E [UΨ(V )]
2E [|U |] ∈ [0, 1],
where U ≡∑i ui. This measure is the unique negative monotone linear functional
of aggregate utility realized UΨ(V ) that is normalized to lie in the unit interval.
1.2 Existence of Equilibria
Proposition 1. For any N > 1 a monotone increasing, type-symmetric Bayes-Nash Equi-
librium v exists.
6The assumptions on the payoff function Ψ are primarily for mathematical convenience. How-
ever, there are some circumstances where a smoothing of the payoff for vote totals near 0 might be
natural: for instance, (i) in some close elections, it might be necessary for the winning side to form
a coalition with some of the losers to form a functioning majority; or (ii) for vote totals near 0, a
recount might be necessary, leading to the possibility that the winning side might be overturned.
7 See section 2 for the definition and a proof that Bayes-Nash equilibria use non-randomized
strategies. Roughly, a type-symmetric equilibrium is a function v(u) such that, if all players use the
rule u 7→ v(u) for buying votes then no player could improve her expected utility by defecting from
the strategy.
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This result follows directly from [12], Theorem 4.5. All of [12]’s conditions can
easily be checked, so we highlight only the less obvious ones. Continuity of payoffs
as functions of the actions vi follows from the continuity and boundedness of Ψ.
Type-conditional utility is only bounded from above, not below, but boundedness
from below can easily be restored by simply deleting for each value type u votes of
magnitude greater
√
2 |u|. The existence of a monotone best-response follows from
the obvious super-modularity of payoffs in value and votes.
Although Nash equilibria always exist, they need not be unique. Indeed, we will
show that in some circumstances (cf. Theorem 3) Nash equilibria have points u∗ of
discontinuity; at any such point, there are at least two distinct pure-strategy Nash
equilibria, one with v(u∗) = v(u∗+), the other with v(u∗) = v(u∗−). We conjecture,
however, that at least when N is large, non-uniqueness of Nash equilibria can only
occur for this trivial reason: in particular, we conjecture that if v1 and v2 are distinct
Nash equilibria then v1(u) = v2(u) for all but at most one value u.
1.3 Rationale for QV
Formally differentiating expression (7) with respect to v (see section 3.1 for a formal
proof) yields the following first-order condition for maximization:
uE [ψ (V−1 + v)] = 2v =⇒ v(u) = E [ψ (V−1 + v(u))]
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
marginal pivotality
u. (8)
The marginal benefit of an additional unit of vote is thus twice the individual’s
value multiplied by the influence this extra vote has on the chance the alternative
is adopted, the vote’s marginal pivotality. The marginal cost of a vote is twice the
number of votes already purchased.
When the number N of voters is large, most would reason that their votes
v(u) will have a negligible effect on the vote total V−1 + v(u). Taking this logic
to an extreme, if voters acted as if marginal pivotality p were constant across the
population, then an individual with value u would buy v(u) = pu votes. This
voting strategy would imply V = p
∑
i ui; that is, the vote total would be exactly
proportional to the sum of the values, and consequently the expected inefficiency
would be 0. Clearly, this argument holds only for a quadratic cost function, because
only quadratic functions have linear derivatives.
Our main results will show, however, that the marginal pivotality is not constant;
in fact, when the mean µ of the sampling distribution F is non-zero the marginal
pivotality can have large jump discontinuities in the tail of the distribution. Thus,
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voters do not buy votes strictly in proportion to their values, and so in general the
vote total will not be a scalar multiple of the aggregate value
∑
i ui.
1.4 Main Results
Our main results concern the structure of equilibria in the game described in the
previous section when the number N of agents is large, and the implications for
the efficiency of QV.
1.4.1 Characterization of equilibrium in the zero mean case
The structure of a Nash equilibrium differs radically depending on whether µ = 0
or µ 6= 0. The case µ = 0, although non-generic, is of particular interest because in
some elections – for instance, when two candidates are vying for an elected office
– the alternatives may be tailored so that an approximate population balance is
achieved [10].
Theorem 1. For any sampling distribution F with mean µ = 0 that satisfies the hypotheses
above, there exist constants N → 0 such that in any Nash equilibrium, v(u) is C∞ and
strictly increasing on [u, u] and satisfies the following approximate proportionality rule:∣∣∣∣v(u)pNu − 1
∣∣∣∣ ≤ N where pN = 1
2
3
4
√
σ 4
√
pi(N − 1) . (9)
Furthermore, there exist constants αN , βN → 0 such that in any equilibrium the vote total
V = VN and expected inefficiency satisfy
|E[V ]| ≤ αN
√
var(V ) and (10)
EI < βN . (11)
The proof will be given in section 9.
Thus, in any equilibrium, agents buy votes approximately in proportion to their
values ui, which corresponds to their behavior under price-taking, as described in
the previous section. Given this approximate proportionality, it is not difficult to
understand why the number of votes a typical voter buys should be of order N−1/4.
If the vote function v(u) in a Bayes-Nash equilibrium follows a proportionality rule
v(u) ≈ βu, the constant β must be the consensus marginal pivotality. On the other
hand, by the local limit theorem of probability (see [3], ch. XVI), if β = CN−α for
some constants C 6= 0 and α ∈ R, the chance that V ∈ [−δ, δ] would be of order
Nα−
1
2 , and so α must be 1/4.
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Although the relation (9) asserts the ratio v(u)/u is approximately constant, it is
not exactly constant: in fact, v(u) is a genuinely nonlinear function of u. Thus, even
though E[U ] = 0, it need not be the case that E[V ] = 0. To establish the asymptotic
efficiency assertion (11), we must establish assertion (10), namely, that the non-
linearities vanish rapidly enough that the bias created by non-linearity is smaller
than the sampling variation in u. This will require a rather subtle application of
the Edgeworth expansion of the distribution of V−1. If it were the case that E[V ] = 0,
and if the distribution of V−1 were exactly normal, a standard Taylor expansion
and the N−1/4 decay of v(u)/u could be used directly to show that non-linearities
vanish with N−1 even relative to the leading term of v(u)/u. A detailed analysis of
this argument leads us to conjecture that, under the hypotheses of Theorem 1, the
inefficiency of QV decays like µ23/(16σ6N).
1.4.2 Characterization of equilibrium in the non-zero mean case
When µ is not zero, the nature of equilibrium can be quite different: in particular, if
the payoff function is sufficiently sharp (the support of its derivative is sufficiently
small) then for sufficiently large N , any type-symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium
has a large discontinuity in the extreme tail of the sampling distribution. Neverthe-
less, in all cases the quadratic voting mechanism is asymptotically efficient, as the
following theorem shows.
Theorem 2. Assume that the sampling distribution F has mean µ > 0 and that F and
Ψ satisfy the hypotheses above. Then there exist constants βN → 0 such that in any
type-symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium v(u),
EI < βN . (12)
Furthermore, there exist constants α ≥ δ and β > 0 depending on the sampling distribution
F and the payoff function Ψ but not on N such that in any equilibrium v(u), for any  > 0,
sup
u+βN−3/2≤u≤u
|v(u)− αµ−1u/N | < αN/N and hence (13)
P{|VN − α| > } ≤ N , (14)
where N , αN → 0 are constants that depend only on the sample size N , and not on the
particular equilibrium.
This theorem allows for two cases. In the first, where α = δ, the vote total is near
δ with high probability for large N . This case occurs for large δ and thus relatively
smooth payoff functions. In the second, α > δ, so that with high probability the
vote total is outside [−δ, δ] for large N . This case arises when δ > 0 is small. In
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both cases, the approximate proportionality rule (13) holds except possibly in the
extreme lower tail of the value distribution F .
To see how the dichotomy arises, suppose that for some α ≥ δ there were a
value w ∈ (−δ, 0) such that
(1−Ψ(w)) |u| > (α− w)2; (15)
then an agent with value ui near the lower extreme u, knowing that with high prob-
ability the one-out vote total V−i =
∑
j 6=i vj is near α, would find it worthwhile to
buy−α+w votes and thus single-handedly move the vote total to w. Consequently,
there can be no equilibrium in which V−i concentrates strictly below α if such a w
exists, as this would lead a large number of individuals to act as extremists, con-
tradicting the concentration of the vote total. Therefore, in any equilibrium the
voters with positive values uj must buy enough votes to guarantee that the vote
total concentrates at or above α. The minimal value α ≥ δ at which the advantage
of “extremist” behavior in the extreme lower tail disappears thus determines the
equilibrium behavior (13). This will be at α = δ unless there is a solution to the
following problem.
Optimization Problem. Determine α > δ and a matching real number w ∈ [−δ, 0]
such that
(1−Ψ(w)) |u| = (α− w)2 and (16)
(1−Ψ(w′)) |u| ≤ (α− w′)2 for all w′ ∈ (−δ, δ) \ {w}
Proposition 2. If δ < 1/
√
2 then there exists a unique pair α > δ and w ∈ [−δ, 0] that
satisfy the Optimization Problem (16).
The proof will be given in section 10. When the Optimization Problem has a
solution, Nash equilibria take a rather interesting form in which extremists must
appear, but with vanishing probability, as the following theorem shows.
Theorem 3. Assume that the sampling distribution F has mean µ > 0 and that F and
Ψ satisfy the hypotheses above. Assume further that the Optimization Problem (16) has a
unique solution (α,w). Then there exists a constant ζ > 0 depending on F such that for
any  > 0 and any type-symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium v(u), when N is sufficiently
large,
(i) v(u) has a single discontinuity at u∗, where |u∗ + |u| − ζN−2| < N−2;
(ii) |v(u) + α− w| <  for u ∈ [u, u∗); and
(iii) the approximate proportionality rule (13) holds for all u ∈ [u∗, u].
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Theorems 2 and 3 will be proved in section 8.
Theorem 3 implies that an agent with value u will buy approximately αµ−1u/N
votes unless u is in the extreme lower tail of F . Since such exceptional agents
occur only with probability ≈ ζN−1f(u), it follows by the law of large numbers
that with probability ≈ 1− ζN−1f(u), the vote total will be very near α. If, on the
other hand, the sample contains an agent with value less than u∗ then this agent
will buy approximately α − w ≈ −√|u| votes, enough to move the overall vote
total close to w. Agents of the first type will be called moderates, and agents of the
second kind extreme contrarians or extremists for short. Because the tail region in
which extremists reside has F−probability on the order N−2, the sample of agents
will contain an extremist with probability only on the order N−1, and will contain
two or more extremists with probability on the order N−2. Given that the sample
contains no extremists, the conditional probability that |V − α| >  is O(e−%n) for
some % > 0, by standard large deviations estimates, and so the event that V < 0
essentially coincides with the event that the sample contains an extremist.
Why does equilibrium take the somewhat counter-intuitive form described in
Theorem 3? Following is a brief heuristic explanation. For an agent i with value ui
in the “bulk” of the sampling distribution F , there is very little information about
the vote total V in the agent’s value ui, and so for most such agents the marginal
pivotality Eψ (V−i + v(ui)) will be approximately Eψ(V ). Consequently, v(u) will
be approximately linear in u except possibly in the extreme tails of the distribution,
and so by the law of large numbers, the vote total will, with high probability, be
near 1
2
NµEψ(V ).
Because µ > 0, agents with negative values will, with high probability, be
on the losing side of the election. However, if 1
2
NµEψ(V ) were small, then an
agent with even moderately negative value could increase her expected utility
by buying more than 1
2
NµEψ(V ) votes; since many voters with negative values
would find it beneficial to adopt such a strategy, the vote total would, with high
probability, be negative, in contradiction to the fact that it must be concentrated
near 1
2
NµEψ(V ).Therefore, NEψ(V )µ must remain bounded away from 0.
On the other hand, if 1
2
NµEψ(V ) were too large, then no individual could prof-
itably act as an extremist, so except with exponentially small probability V would
be bounded away from [−δ, δ]. But this would force Eψ(V ) to be exponentially
small, which is impossible. Thus, the aggregate number of votes must concentrate
near a constant value, and so most voters must buy on the order of 1/N votes. For
this scenario to occur, Eψ(V ) must decay as 1
N
. But the primary contribution to
this expectation must come from the event in which an extremist exists, and so the
probability of this event must decay as 1
N
.
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1.5 Plan of the paper
The remainder of the paper will be devoted to the proofs of Theorems 1–3 and
Proposition 2. Because essentially nothing (other than monotonicity) is known a
priori about the nature of Nash equilibria, information must be teased out in steps,
each relying on the previous steps. In section 4, a weak form of the approximate
proportionality rule will be proved for agents in the bulk of the distribution F .
Using this weak approximate proportionality rule, we will, in section 5, use an anti-
concentration inequality for sums of i.i.d. random variables to derive bounds for
Nash equilibria. In section 6 we will show that any discontinuities must be large,
and that except at discontinuities any Nash equilibrium must be smooth. We will
then be able to deduce, in section 7, that approximate proportionality holds except
in the extreme tails of F . The proofs of Theorems 2–3 will be given in section 8, and
the proof of Theorem 1 in section 9. Finally, the proof of Proposition 2 will be given
in section 10.
2 Terminology and Notation
Under the model assumptions we have stipulated, it would never make sense for
an agent to purchase more than
√
2u or fewer than−√2|u| votes. Consequently, we
shall restrict attention to strategies under which, with probability one, the number
of votes purchased by any agent falls in the interval [−√2u,√2u]. A pure strategy is
a Borel measurable function v : [u, u] → [−√2 |u|,√2u]; when a pure strategy v is
adopted, each agent buys v(u) votes, where u is the agent’s utility. A mixed strategy
is a Borel measurable8 function piV : [u, u] → Π, where Π is the collection of Borel
probability measures on [−√2 |u|,√2u]; when a mixed strategy piV is adopted, each
agent i will buy a random number Vi of votes, where V1, V2, . . . are conditionally
independent given the utilities U1, U2, . . . and Vi has conditional distribution piV (Ui).
Clearly, the set of mixed strategies contains the pure strategies.
A best response for an agent with utility u to a strategy (either pure or mixed) is
a value v such that
EΨ(v + Sn)u− v2 = sup
v˜
EΨ(v˜ + Sn)u− v˜2, (17)
where Sn is the sum of the votes of the other n agents when these agents all play
the specified strategy and E denotes expectation. (Thus, under E, the random
8The space of Borel probability measures on [−√2 |u|,√2u] is given the topology of weak con-
vergence; Borel measurability of a function with range Π is relative to the Borel field induced by
this topology. Proposition 5 below implies that in the Quadratic Voting game only pure strategies
are relevant, so measurability issues play no role in this paper.
10
variables Vi of the n other voters are distributed in accordance with the strategy and
the sampling rule for utility values Ui described above.) Because Ψ is continuous
and bounded, equation (17) and the dominated convergence theorem imply that
for each u the set of best responses is closed and hence has well-defined maximal
and minimal elements v+(u), v−(u).
A mixed strategy piV is a type-symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium, or Nash equilib-
rium for short, if for every u ∈ [u, u] the measure piV (u) is supported by the set of
best responses to piV for an agent with utility u. Two strategies will be called equiv-
alent if they coincide for all u except in a set of Lebesgue measure 0. Because the
values Ui of the various agents are sampled from a distribution that is absolutely
continuous, if two strategies are equivalent then with probability one they result in
exactly the same actions.
Notation. The symbols Ψ, ψ, δ, F , µ, ζ, u, u will be reserved for the functions and
constants specified in Subsection 3.1 of the text, and the letters N, n will be used
only for the sample size and sample size minus one. The symbols α, β, γ, , % and C
will be used for generic constants whose values might change from one lemma to
the next. Because many of the arguments to follow will involve the values of the
equilibrium vote function v at points near one of the endpoints u, u, we will use the
following shorthand notation, for any 0 <  < 1:
u = u−  and u = u+ .
3 Nash Equilibria: Basic Properties
3.1 Necessary Condition for a Nash Equilibrium
Let piV be a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, and let Sn be the sum of the votes
of n agents with utilities Ui obtained by random sampling from F , all acting in
accordance with the strategy piV . For an agent with utility u, a best response v must
satisfy equation (17), and so in particular for every ∆ > 0, if u > 0 then
E {Ψ(Sn + v + ∆)−Ψ(Sn + v)}u ≤ 2∆v + ∆2 and
E {Ψ(Sn + v −∆)−Ψ(Sn + v)}u ≤ −2∆v + ∆2
Similarly, if u < 0 and ∆ > 0 then
E {Ψ(Sn + v −∆)−Ψ(Sn + v)}u ≤ −2∆v + ∆2 and
E {Ψ(Sn + v + ∆)−Ψ(Sn + v)}u ≤ 2∆v + ∆2
Because Ψ is C∞ and its derivative ψ has compact support, differentiation under
the expectation is permissible. Thus, we have the following necessary condition.
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Proposition 3. If piV is a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium then for every u a best response
v must satisfy
Eψ(Sn + v)u = 2v. (18)
Consequently, every pure-strategy Nash equilibrium v(u) must satisfy the functional equa-
tion
Eψ(Sn + v(u))u = 2v(u). (19)
3.2 Monotonicity Properties of Nash Equilibria
Lemma 4. Let piV be a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, and let v, v˜ be best responses for
agents with utilities u, u˜, respectively. If u = 0 then v = 0, and if u < u˜, then v ≤ v˜.
Consequently, any pure-strategy Nash equilibrium v(u) is a nondecreasing function of
u and therefore has at most countably many discontinuities and is differentiable almost
everywhere.
Proof. It is obvious that the only best response for an agent with u = 0 is v = 0, and
the monotonicity of the payoff function Ψ implies a best response v for an agent
with utility u must be of the same sign as u. If v, v˜ are best responses for agents
with utilities 0 ≤ u < u˜, then by definition
EΨ(v˜ + Sn)u˜− v˜2 ≥ EΨ(v + Sn)u˜− v2 and
EΨ(v + Sn)u− v2 ≥ EΨ(v˜ + Sn)u− v˜2,
and so, after re-arrangement of terms,
(EΨ(v˜ + Sn)− EΨ(v + Sn))u˜ ≥ v˜2 − v2 and
(EΨ(v˜ + Sn)− EΨ(v + Sn))u ≤ v˜2 − v2.
Hence,
(EΨ(v˜ + Sn)− EΨ(v + Sn))(u˜− u) ≥ 0.
The monotonicity of Ψ implies that if 0 ≤ v˜ < v then EΨ(v˜+Sn) ≤ EΨ(v+Sn), and
so it follows that the two expectations must be equal, because u˜− u > 0. But if the
two expectations were equal v could not possibly be a best response at u, because
an agent with utility u could obtain the same expected payoff EΨ(v + Sn)u at a
lower vote cost by purchasing v˜ votes. This argument proves that if 0 ≤ u < u˜
best responses v, v˜ for agents with utilities u, u˜ must satisfy 0 ≤ v ≤ v˜. A similar
argument shows that if u < u˜ ≤ 0 best responses v, v˜ for agents with utilities u, u˜
must satisfy v ≤ v˜ ≤ 0.
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Proposition 5. If a mixed strategy piV is a Nash equilibrium, the set of utility values
u ∈ [u, u] for which more than one best response (and hence the set of values u such that
piV (u) is not supported by just a single point v(u)) is at most countable.
Proof of Proposition 5. For each u denote by v−(u) and v+(u) the minimal and maxi-
mal best responses at u. Lemma 4 implies that if u < u˜ then v+(u) ≤ v−(u˜). Conse-
quently, for any  > 0 the set of utilities values u at which v+(u)− v−(u) ≥  must
be finite, because otherwise v+(u)→∞ as u→ u, which is impossible because best
responses must take values between −√2 |u| and √2u.
Because by hypothesis the values Ui are sampled from a distribution F that
is absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure, the probability that
one of the votes i will have utility value Ui equal to one of the countably many
values where more than one best response exists is zero. Consequently, for every
Nash equilibrium an equivalent pure-strategy Nash equilibrium v(u) exists. Hence-
forth, we consider only pure-strategy Nash equilibria; whenever we refer to a Nash
equilibrium we mean a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 6. If v(u) is a Nash equilibrium then v(u) 6= 0 for all u 6= 0.
Proof. If v(u) = 0 for some u > 0 then by Lemma 4 v(u′) = 0 for all u′ ∈ (0, u).
Because the density f(u) of the value distribution F is strictly positive on [u, u], it
follows that the probability p that every agent in the sample casts vote Vi = 0 is
strictly positive. But then an agent with utility u could improve her expectation by
buying ε > 0 votes, where ε uψ(0)p, because the expected utility gain would be
at least
uΨ(ε)p ∼ uψ(0)pε
at a cost of ε2. Because by hypothesis ψ(0) > 0, the expected utility gain would
overwhelm the increased vote cost for small ε > 0.
Corollary 7. Any Nash equilibrium v(u) is strictly increasing on [u, u].
Proof. By Lemma 6 and the necessary condition (19),
Eψ(Sn + v(u)) > 0 for every u ∈ [u, u] \ {0}. (20)
Differentiating in (19) with respect to u shows that
Eψ(Sn + v(u)) = (2− Eψ′(Sn + v(u)))v′(u) (21)
at every u ∈ D, where D is the set of values u where v(u) is differentiable. Since
v(u) is nondecreasing, by Lemma 4, it follows that 2 ≥ Eψ′(Sn + v(u)) at all points
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of D; since Eψ(Sn + v(u)) > 0, it follows that v′(u) > 0 at every u ∈ D. But since
v is nondecreasing, Dc has Lebesgue measure 0, so for any two values u1 < u2 in
[u, u],
v(u2)− v(u1) ≥
ˆ
[u1,u2]∩D
v′(u) du > 0.
4 Weak Consensus Estimates
According to Lemma 3, in any Nash equilibrium the number of votes v(u) an agent
with utility u purchases must satisfy the necessary condition (19). It is natural to
expect that when the sample size n+ 1 is large the effect of adding a single vote v
to the aggregate total Sn should be small, and so one might expect that the function
v(u) should satisfy the approximate proportionality rule
2v(u) ≈ Eψ(Sn)u.
As we will show later, this naive approximation can fail badly for utility values u in
the extreme tails of the distribution F ; however, in the bulk of the value distribution
approximate proportionality does indeed hold (cf. Proposition 20 in Sec. 7.1). In
this section, we will prove the following weaker version of Proposition 20.
Lemma 8. For every  > 0 and every α > 0, if n is sufficiently large then in any Nash
equilibrium v(·),
Eψ(v(u) + Sn) ≥ (1− α)Eψ(v(u′) + Sn) (22)
for any two values u, u′ not within distance  of either u, or u, or 0.
The proof will require the following a priori lower bound.
Lemma 9. There exists γ > 0 such that for all sufficiently large n, in any Nash equilibrium,
max(v(u1/n),−v(u1/n) ≥ γ/n. (23)
Proof. Suppose inequality (23) did not hold; then with probability ≈ (1 − (f(u) +
f(u))/n)n ≈ exp{−f(u) − f(u)} := p, the values of all agents would lie in the
interval [u1/n, u1/n], and so the vote total would be no more than γ in absolute
value. But if γ were sufficiently small, then an agent with value u = 1 would find
it advantageous to defect from the equilibrium strategy by buying 3γ votes, at
cost 9γ2, thus raising her expected payoff by at least p(Ψ(2γ)−Ψ(γ)) ≈ pψ(γ)γ 
9γ2.
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Proof of Lemma 8. Let J1, J2, . . . , Jk be any partition of the interval [u, u] into non-
overlapping Borel sets of positive Lebesgue measure, and for each index i let Mi be
the number of agents (in the entire sample of size N = n+ 1) with values in the set
Ji. The random vector (M1,M2, . . . ,Mk) has the multinomial distribution
P (Mi = mi for each i ≤ k) = (n+ 1)!
m1!m2! · · ·mk!
k∏
i=1
pmii
where
pi = P (U1 ∈ Ji) =
ˆ
Ji
f(u) du.
Conditional on the event that Mi = mi for each i ≤ k, the sample {U1, U2, . . . , Un}
has the same distribution as a stratified random sample gotten by choosing mi ele-
ments from the set Ji according to the density f1Ji/pi for each i ≤ k. Consequently,
for any choice of index i ≤ k,
E[ψ(v(Un+1) + Sn) |Un+1 ∈ Ji] =∑
m1,m2,...,mk
n!
m1!m2! · · ·mk!
(
k∏
i=1
pmii
)
E∗(m1,m2, . . . ,mi−1,mi + 1,mi+1, . . .mk) (24)
where
E∗(m1,m2, . . . ,mk) = E(ψ(Sn+1) |Mi = mi ∀ i ≤ k)
for any set of nonnegative integers mj that sum to n+ 1. Note that the expectations
E∗(m1,m2, . . . ,mk) are all bounded above by ‖ψ‖∞.
The proof of the lemma will be based on systematic exploitation of equation
(24). There are eight separate cases, depending on whether u and u′ are positive or
negative, and on which of v(u1/n) or −v(ui/n) exceeds γ/n (cf. Lemma 9). Since all
of these are similar, we shall consider only the case u, u′ > 0 and v(u1/n) ≥ γ/n.
To relate the conditional expectation (24) to the expectation in the necessary
condition (19), we appeal to the monotonicity of v(·). Fix u ∈ (, u] and let J =
[u− αu, u] and J ′ = [u, u+ αu], where α > 0 is small enough that J ⊂ [, u]; then by
(19) and the monotonicity of v,
(1− α)Eψ(v(u′) + Sn) ≤ Eψ(v(u) + Sn) for all u′ ∈ J and
(1 + α)Eψ(v(u′′) + Sn) ≥ Eψ(v(u) + Sn) for all u′′ ∈ J ′.
Consequently,
(1− α)E[ψ(v(Un+1) + Sn) |Un+1 ∈ J ] ≤ Eψ(v(u) + Sn) and (25)
(1 + α)E[ψ(v(Un+1) + Sn) |Un+1 ∈ J ′] ≥ Eψ(v(u) + Sn).
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Thus, to prove (22), it suffices to prove analogous inequalities for conditional expec-
tations. For this we will need the following crude lower bound on Nash equilibria,
which we will deduce from Lemma 9.
Claim 10. For every  > 0 there exists C = C > 0 such that for all sufficiently large n
and any Nash equilibrium v(·),
v(u) ≥ C
n3/2
for every u ∈ [, u].
Proof of Claim 10. By (25) and the necessary condition (19), it suffices to prove that
for some interval J1 = [u− αu, u] and some C > 0,
Eψ(v(Un+1) + Sn) |Un+1 ∈ J1] ≥ Cn−3/2
for all n sufficiently large and any Nash equilibrium v. Fix β > 0, and let J2 =
J2(β) = [uβn−3/2 , u], and let J3 be the complement of J1 ∪ J2 in [u, u]. (Observe
that J2 has F−probability p2 ∼ βf(u)/n3/2; however, J1 is fixed for all n, as is its
F−probability p1.) By Lemma 9, inequality (25), and the monotonicity of v, we
have
Eψ(v(Un+1) + Sn) |Un+1 ∈ J2] ≥ γ′n−1
for some γ′ > 0 not depending on n. Thus, it suffices to show that for all sufficiently
large n and any Nash equilibrium v,
Eψ(v(Un+1) + Sn) |Un+1 ∈ J1]
Eψ(v(Un+1) + Sn) |Un+1 ∈ J2] ≥
βf(u)
8n1/2
. (26)
For brevity, we shall denote the numerator by E1 and the denominator by
E2. Both E1 and E2 can be expressed as sums of the form (24). In both sums
the same factors E∗(m1,m2,m3) occur, with these exceptions: in E1 only factors
E∗(m1,m2,m3) with m1 ≥ 1 occur, but in E2 only factors E∗(m1,m2,m3) with
m2 ≥ 1 occur. The contribution to either expectation Ei from terms with fac-
tors E∗(m1,m2,m3) with m1 ≤ np1/2 is negligible, because by standard results
in large deviation theory (e.g., Hoeffding’s inequality, cf. [7]) the probability that
M1 ≤ np1/2 decays exponentially in n. The contribution to E1 from terms with
factors E∗(m1,m2,m3) where m2 ≥ 4 is O(n−5) (because this is the chance of having
4 or more elements in J2 in a sample of size n + 1), and similarly the contribution
to E2 from terms with factors E∗(m1,m2,m3) where m2 ≥ 4 is O(n−7/2). Since these
are of smaller order of magnitude than n−3, they can also be ignored.
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Now for any triple (m1,m2,m3) with m1 ≥ 1 and m2 ≥ 1, terms with factor
E∗(m1,m2,m3) occur, but with different coefficients
n!
(m1 − 1)!m2!m3!p
m1−1
1 p
m2
2 p
m3
3 in E1, and
n!
m1!(m2 − 1)!m3!p
m1
1 p
m2−1
2 p
m3
3 in E2.
The ratio of these coefficients (E1 to E2) is
m1
m2
p2
p1
∼ m1f(u)
p1m2n3/2
By the remarks above, terms with m1 ≤ np1/2 or m2 ≥ 4 can be ignored; for the
rest, the coefficient ratio is, for all large n, at least
βf(u)
4n1/2
.
Therefore, E1/E2 ≥ f(u)/(8n1/2) for all large n, proving the Claim.
The proof of inequality (22) follows a similar line, but requires the result of
Claim 10 to justify ignoring terms of exponentially small size. By inequalities (25),
it suffices to show that for any α > 0 and any two non-overlapping intervals J1, J2
of positive length contained in [, u− ],
E[ψ(v(Un+1) + Sn) |Un+1 ∈ J1]
E[ψ(v(Un+1) + Sn) |Un+1 ∈ J2] ≥ 1− α
provided n is sufficiently large. As in the proof of the Claim, denote the numerator
and denominator by E1 and E2, respectively.
Each of the expectations E1, E2 has a representation (24) with k = 3, where J3
is the complement of J1 ∪ J2 in [u, u]. For any β > 0, the contribution to either
E1 or E2 from terms of (24) for which |mi − npi| ≥ nβpi is exponentially small, by
Hoeffding’s inequality, and hence can be ignored. For any triple (m1,m2,m3) with
mi ≥ 1 and m2 ≥ 1, terms with factor E∗(m1,m2,m3) occur in both E1 and E2, with
the same coefficients as in the proof of the Claim. The ratio of these coefficients (E1
to E2) is
m1
m2
p2
p1
.
Since only those triples with |mi − npi| < nβpi contribute substantially to the
expectations, it follows that for large n,
E1
E2
≥ 1 + 2β
1− 2β .
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Clearly, if β > 0 is sufficiently small then the lower bound will exceed 1− α. This
completes the proof of Lemma 8.
The proof of Claim 10 – in particular, the inequalities (25) and (26) – also yields
the following result, which will be used in the proof of Lemma 14 below.
Corollary 11. For any β > 0, all sufficiently large n and every Nash equilibrium v,
Eψ(v(u) + Sn)
Eψ(v(uβn−3/2) + Sn)
≥ βf(u)
8n1/2
and
Eψ(v(u) + Sn)
Eψ(v(uβn−3/2) + Sn)
≥ βf(u)
8n1/2
.
5 Concentration and size constraints
Because the vote total Sn is the sum of independent, identically distributed random
variables v(Ui) (albeit with unknown distribution), its distribution is subject to
concentration restrictions, such as those imposed by the following lemma.
Lemma 12. For any  > 0 there exists γ = γ() < ∞ such that for all sufficiently large
values of n and any Nash equilibrium v(u), if
‖v‖∞ ≥  (27)
then
|v(u)| ≤ γ√
n
for all u ∈ [u, u]. (28)
We will deduce Lemma 12 from the following general fact about sums of inde-
pendent, identically distributed random variables.
Lemma 13. Fix α > 0. For any  > 0 and any C <∞ there exists C ′ = C ′(, C) > 0 and
n′ = n′(, C) <∞ such that the following statement is true: if n ≥ n′ and Y1, Y2, . . . , Yn
are independent random variables such that
E|Y1 − EY1|3 ≤ Cvar(Y1)3/2 and var(Y1) ≥ C ′/n (29)
then for every interval J ⊂ R of length α or greater,
P
{
n∑
i=1
Yi ∈ J
}
≤ |J |/α. (30)
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The proof of this lemma, a routine exercise in the use of Fourier methods, is
relegated to the end of this section.
Proof of Lemma 12. By Lemma 8, there exists a constant α > 0 such that for any
point u ∈ [u, u] \ [−2, 2] the ratio v(u)/u is at least αv(u)/u. Because the density
f is bounded below, it follows that for suitable constants 0 < C <∞ and 1
2
> p > 0,
for all sufficiently large n and every Nash equilibrium v(u) there are intervals
J+ = [u+, u] ⊂ (0, u) and
J− = [u−, u] ⊂ (u, 0),
both with F−probability p, such that
max(v(u),−v(u)) ≤ C min(v(u+),−v(u−)).
Consequently, if g = f1J+∪J−/2p is the conditional density of a value U given that
U ∈ J+∪J−, then g has variance at least min(v(u+)2, v(u−)2)/4, and its third moment
obeys the restriction (29).
LetM be the number of points Ui in the sample U1, U2, . . . , Un that fall in J+∪J−,
and let S∗n be the sum of the votes v(Ui) for those agents i whose values Ui fall in
this range. By construction, M has the binomial-(n, 2p) distribution. Moreover,
conditional on the event M = m and Sn − S∗n = w, the random variable S∗n is
the sum of m independent random variables Yi with density g. Consequently, by
Lemma 13, if either v(u)
√
n or v(u)
√
n is sufficiently large then the conditional
probability, given M = m ≥ np and Sn − S∗n = w, that S∗n lies in any interval of
length 4δ is bounded above by /2. Therefore, for every v ∈ R,
Eψ(Sn + v) ≤ ‖ψ‖∞ (P{M ≤ np}+ /2) .
Since P{M ≤ np} decays exponentially as n → ∞, the lemma follows, by the
necessary condition (19).
Lemma 12 implies that for any  > 0, if n is sufficiently large then for any Nash
equilibrium v(u), the absolute value |v(u)| can assume large values only at utility
values u within distance  of one of the endpoints u, u. The following proposition
improves this bound to the extreme tails of the distribution.
Lemma 14. For any 0 <  < ∞ there exists β = β() > 0 such that for all sufficiently
large n, every Nash equilibrium v(u) satisfies the inequality
|v(u)| ≤  (31)
for all u at distance greater than βn−3/2 from both endpoints u, u.
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Proof. Lemma 12 implies that for any  > 0 there exists γ = γ() > 0 such that if n
is sufficiently large and ‖v‖∞ ≥  then 2v(u) ≤ γ/
√
n for all u ∈ [u, u]. Hence, by
the necessary condition (19),
Eψ(v(u) + Sn)u ≤ γ√
n
.
But by Corollary 11, for any β > 0, if n is sufficiently large then for every Nash
equilibrium v,
Eψ(v(u) + Sn)
Eψ(v(uβn−3/2) + Sn)
≥ βf(u)
8
√
n
for all u, and in particular for u = u. The last two displayed inequalities now
combine to yield
Eψ(v(uβn−3/2) + Sn) ≤
8γ
βf(u)u
=⇒ 2v(uβn−3/2) ≤
8γ
βf(u)
;
thus, the inequality 2v(u) >  can hold at some u = uβn−3/2 only if
β <
8γ
f(u)u
.
Proof of Lemma 13. It suffices to prove this for intervals of length δ, because any
interval of length nδ can be partitioned into n pairwise disjoint intervals each of
length δ. Without loss of generality, EY1 = 0 and δ = 1 (if not, translate and re-
scale). Let g be a nonnegative, even, C∞ function with ‖g‖∞ = 1 that takes the
value 1 on [−1
2
, 1
2
] and is identically zero outside [−1, 1]. It is enough to show that
for any x ∈ R,
Eg(Sn + x) ≤ .
Because g is C∞, even, and has compact support, its Fourier transform is real-
valued and integrable, so the Fourier inversion theorem implies
Eg(Sn + x) =
1
2pi
ˆ
gˆ(θ)ϕ(−θ)ne−iθx dθ,
where ϕ(θ) = EeiθY1 is the characteristic function of Y1. Because EY1 = 0, the
derivative of the characteristic function at θ = 0 is 0, and hence ϕ has Taylor
expansion
|1− ϕ(θ)− 1
2
EY 21 θ
2| ≤ 1
6
E|Y1|3|θ|3.
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Consequently, if the hypotheses (29) hold then for any γ > 0, if n is sufficiently
large,
|ϕ(θ)n| ≤ e−β2θ2/4
for all |θ| ≤ γ. This bound implies (because |gˆ| ≤ 2) that
Eg(Sn + x) ≤ 1
pi
ˆ
|θ|<γ
e−β
2θ2/4 dθ +
1
2pi
ˆ
|θ|≥γ
|gˆ(θ)| dθ.
Because gˆ is integrable, the constant γ can be chosen so that the second integral
is less that /2, and if β is sufficiently large then the first integral is bounded by
/2.
6 Discontinuities and Smoothness
6.1 Discontinuities
Because any Nash equilibrium v(u) is monotone in the utility u, it can have at
most countably many discontinuities. Moreover, because any Nash equilibrium is
bounded in absolute value by
√
2 max (|u| , u) (because no agent will pay more for
votes than she could gain in expected utility) the sum of the jumps is bounded by√
2 max (|u| , u). We will now establish a lower on the size of |v| at a discontinuity.
Lemma 15. Let v(u) be a Nash equilibrium. If v is discontinuous at u ∈ (u, u) then
Eψ′(v˜ + Sn)u = 2 (32)
for some v˜ ∈ [v−, v+], where v− and v+ are the left and right limits of v(u′) as u′ → u.
Proof. The necessary condition (19) holds at all u′ in a neighborhood of u, so by
monotonicity of v and continuity of ψ, Equation (19) must hold when v(u) is re-
placed by either of v±, that is,
2v+ = Eψ(v+ + Sn)u and
2v− = Eψ(v− + Sn)u.
Subtracting one equation from the other and using the differentiability of ψ we
obtain
2v+ − 2v− = uE
ˆ v+
v−
ψ′(t+ Sn) dt = u
ˆ v+
v−
Eψ′(t+ Sn) dt.
The result then follows from the mean value theorem of calculus.
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Lemma 16. There exists ∆ > 0 such that for all sufficiently large n, at any point u∗ of
discontinuity of a Nash equilibrium,
v+ := lim
u→u∗+
v(u) ≥ ∆ if u∗ ≥ 0 and (33)
v− := lim
u→u∗−
v(u) ≤ −∆ if u∗ ≤ 0.
Consequently, there exists β < ∞ such that if n is sufficiently large n then no Nash
equilibrium v(·) has a discontinuity at a point u at distance greater than βn−3/2 from one
of the endpoints u, u.
Proof. Because the function ψ has support contained in the interval [−δ, δ], equation
(32) implies v can have a discontinuity at u∗ only if the distribution of Sn is highly
concentrated: specifically,
P{Sn + v˜ ∈ [−δ, δ]} ≥ 2‖ψ′‖max (|u| , u)
for some v˜ ∈ [v−, v+], where v− and v+ are the right and left limits of v at u∗. In fact,
because ψ′ vanishes at the endpoints of [−δ, δ], there exists 0 < δ′ < δ such that
P{Sn + v˜ ∈ [−δ′, δ′]} ≥ 1‖ψ′‖max (|u| , u) .
Hence, because the function ψ is bounded away from 0 on the interval [−δ′, δ′],
Eψ(v˜ + Sn) ≥ minu∈[−δ
′δ′] ψ(u)
‖ψ′‖∞max (|u| , u) . (34)
Lemma 12 asserts that such strong concentration of the distribution of Sn can
occur only if |v(u)| is vanishingly small in the interior of the interval [u, u]. In
particular, if  < (‖ψ′‖max (|u| , u))−1 and n is sufficiently large then |v(u)| < γ/
√
n
for all u ∈ [u, u]. But v(u) must satisfy the necessary condition (19) at all such u,
so
Eψ(v(u) + Sn)|u| ≤ 2γ/
√
n
for all u ∈ [u, u], and in particular for u = u and u = u. But by the mean value
theorem,
|Eψ(v˜ + Sn)− Eψ(v(u) + Sn)| ≤ ‖ψ′‖∞|v˜ − v(u)| and
|Eψ(v˜ + Sn)− Eψ(v(u) + Sn)| ≤ ‖ψ′‖∞|v˜ − v(u)|,
so when n is large the inequality (34) can only occur if |v˜| > ∆, where
2∆ =
minu∈[−δ′δ′] ψ(u)
‖ψ′‖2∞max (|u| , u)
Lemma 14 now implies that any such discontinuities can occur only within distance
βn−3/2 of one of the endpoints u, u.
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6.2 Smoothness
Because Nash equilibria are monotone, by Lemma 4, they are necessarily differen-
tiable almost everywhere. We will show that in fact differentiability must hold at
every u, except near the endpoints u, u.
Lemma 17. If v(u) is a Nash equilibrium then at every u where v is differentiable,
Eψ(Sn + v(u)) + Eψ
′(Sn + v(u))uv′(u) = 2v′(u). (35)
Proof. Given the smoothness of the function ψ, the result follows from the chain
and product rules.
Equation (35) can be rewritten as a first-order differential equation:
v′(u) =
Eψ(Sn + v(u))
2− Eψ′(Sn + v(u))u. (36)
This differential equation becomes singular at any point where the denominator
approaches 0, but is regular in any interval where Eψ′(Sn + v(u))u ≤ 1. The fol-
lowing lemma implies regularity on any interval where |v(u)| remains sufficiently
small.
Lemma 18. For any α > 0 there exists β = β(α) > 0 such that for any Nash equilibrium
v(u), any v˜ ∈ R, any u ∈ [u, u], and all n,
E|ψ′(v˜ + Sn)u| ≥ α =⇒ Eψ(v˜ + Sn)|u| ≥ β and (37)
E|ψ′′(v˜ + Sn)u| ≥ α =⇒ Eψ(v˜ + Sn)|u| ≥ β.
Proof. Recall that ψ/2 is a C∞ probability density with support [−δ, δ], and that
ψ is strictly positive in the open interval (−δ, δ). Consequently, on any interval
J ⊂ (−δ, δ) where |ψ′| (or |ψ′′|) is bounded below by a positive number, so is ψ.
Fix  > 0 so small that max (u, u) < α/2. In order that E|ψ′(v˜ + Sn)u| ≥ α, it
must be the case that the event {|ψ′(v˜ + Sn)| ≥ } contributes at least α/2 to the
expectation; hence,
P{|ψ′(v˜ + Sn)| ≥ } ≥ α
2‖ψ′‖∞max (u, u) .
But on this event the random variable ψ(v˜ + Sn) is bounded below by a positive
number η = η, so it follows that
Eψ(v˜ + Sn)|u| ≥ ηα
2‖ψ′‖∞max (u, u) .
A similar argument proves the corresponding result for ψ′′.
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Lemma 19. There are constants C, α > 0 such that for all sufficiently large n, any Nash
equilibrium v(u) is continuously differentiable on any interval where |v(u)| ≤ C (and
therefore, by Lemma 14, on
(
u+ βn−3/2, u− βn−3/2), for some β > 0), and the derivative
satisfies
α ≤ v
′(u)
Eψ(v(u) + Sn)
≤ α−1. (38)
Proof. The function v(u) is differentiable almost everywhere, by Lemma 4, and at
every point u where v(u) is differentiable the differential equation (36) holds. By
Lemma 16, the sizes of discontinuities are bounded below, and so if C > 0 is suffi-
ciently small then a Nash equilibrium v(u) can have no discontinuities on any inter-
val where |v(u)| ≤ C. Furthermore, if C > 0 is sufficiently small then by Lemma 18
and the necessary condition (19), we must have Eψ′(v(u) + Sn) ≤ 1 on any interval
where |v(u)| ≤ C. Because the functions v 7→ Eψ(Sn + v) and v 7→ Eψ′(Sn + v) are
continuous (by dominated convergence), it now follows from Equation (36) that if
C > 0 is sufficiently small then on any interval where |v(u)| ≤ C the function v′(u)
extends to a continuous function. Finally, because the denominator in equation (36)
is at least 1 and no larger than 2 + ‖ψ′‖∞, the inequalities (38) follow.
Similar arguments show that Nash equilibria have derivatives of higher orders
provided the sample size is sufficiently large. The analysis below will require infor-
mation about the second derivative v′′(u), which can be obtained by differentiating
under the expectations in (36):
v′′(u) =
Eψ′(v(u) + Sn)v′(u)
2− Eψ′(Sn + v(u))u
+
Eψ(v(u) + Sn)(Eψ
′′(v(u) + Sn)v′(u)u+ Eψ′(v(u) + Sn)
(2− Eψ′(Sn + v(u)u))2 . (39)
A repetition of the proof of Lemma 19 now shows that for suitable constants C, β >
0 and all sufficiently large n, any Nash equilibrium v(u) is twice continuously
differentiable on any interval where |v(u)| ≤ C and for some α˜ > 0 satisfies the
inequalities
α˜ ≤ v
′′(u)
Eψ(v(u) + Sn)
≤ α˜−1. (40)
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7 Approximate Proportionality
7.1 The approximate proportionality rule
The information that we now have about the form of Nash equilibria can be used to
sharpen the heuristic argument given in Subsection 4 to support the “approximate
proportionality rule”. Recall that any Nash equilibrium v(·) must satisfy the neces-
sary condition 2v(u) = Eψ(v(u) + Sn)u. We have shown in Lemma 14 that for any
Nash equilibrium, v(u) must be small except in the extreme tails of the distribution
(in particular, for all u at distance much more than n−3/2 from both endpoints u, u).
Because ψ is uniformly continuous, it follows that the expectation Eψ(v(u) + Sn)
cannot differ by very much from Eψ(Sn).
Unfortunately, this argument only shows that the approximation 2v(u) ≈ Eψ(Sn)u
is valid up to an error of size n|u|where n → 0 as n→∞. However, as n→∞ the
expectation Eψ(Sn)→ 0, and so the error in the approximation above might be con-
siderably larger than the approximation itself. Proposition 20 makes the stronger
assertion that when n is large the relative error in the approximate proportionality
rule is small.
Proposition 20. For any  > 0 there exists constants n < ∞ and β < ∞ such that if
n ≥ n then for any Nash equilibrium v(u) and for all u ∈
[
uβn−3/2 , uβn−3/2
]
,
(1− )Eψ(Sn)|u| ≤ |2v(u)| ≤ (1 + )Eψ(Sn)|u|. (41)
Furthermore, for all sufficiently large n any Nash equilibrium v(u) with no discontinuities
must satisfy (41) for all u ∈ [u, u].
Proof of Proposition 20. Because ψ is C∞ and has compact support, the function v 7→
Eψ(v+Sn) is differentiable with derivative Eψ′(v+Sn). Consequently, by Taylor’s
theorem, for every u there exists v˜(u) intermediate between 0 and v(u) such that
2v(u) = Eψ(v(u) + Sn)u = Eψ(Sn)u+ Eψ
′(v˜(u) + Sn)v(u)u. (42)
We will argue that for allC > 0 sufficiently small, if |2v(u)| ≤ C then the expectation
Eψ′(v˜(u) + Sn) remains below  in absolute value, provided n is sufficiently large.
Lemma 14 will then imply that for some β <∞ independent of n the inequalities
(41) hold for all u ∈ (u, u) at distance greater than βn−3/2 from the endpoints u, u.
If |2v(u)| ≤ C then |Eψ(v(u) + Sn)| ≤ C/max (|u| , u), by the necessary con-
dition (19). If C < ∆, where ∆ is the discontinuity threshold established in
Lemma 16, then v(u) is continuous on any interval [0, uC ] where |v(u)| ≤ C, so
for each u in this interval there exists u′ ∈ [0, u] such that v˜(u) = v(u′). Conse-
quently, |Eψ(v˜(u) + Sn)| ≤ C/max (|u| , u). But Lemma 18 implies that for any
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 > 0, if C > 0 is sufficiently small then for all large n and any Nash equilibrium
v(u),
|Eψ′(v˜(u) + Sn)| < 
on any interval [0, uC ] where |v(u)| ≤ C. Thus, the error in the approximation (42)
will be small when n is large and |2v(u)| < C, for u > 0. A similar argument applies
for u ≤ 0. This proves that (41) holds for all u ∈ (u, u) at distance greater than
βn−3/2 from the endpoints u, u.
Finally, suppose that v(u) is a Nash equilibrium with no discontinuities. By
Lemma 14, for any C > 0 there exists β < ∞ exists such that |v(u)| ≤ C/2 ex-
cept at arguments u within distance β/n3/2 of one of the endpoints. Moreover, by
Lemma 19, if C is sufficiently small then on any interval where |v(u)| ≤ C the func-
tion v is differentiable, with derivative v′(u) ≤ C ′ for some constant C ′ < ∞ not
depending on n or on the particular Nash equilibrium. Because v(u) is continuous
up to u, if v(u) ≥ C for some u > u−βn−3/2 then by the intermediate value theorem
there would a smallest u′ ∈ [u− βn−3/2, u] at which v(u′) = C. But then v would be
differentiable all the way up to u′, with derivative bounded above by C ′, and so
C = v(u′) = v(u− βn−3/2) +
ˆ u′
u−βn−3/2
v′(u) du
≤ C/2 +
ˆ u′
u−βn−3/2
v′(u) du
≤ C/2 + C ′βn−3/2,
which is impossible for large n. A similar argument shows that for large n, if v(u)
has no discontinuities then v cannot attain the value −C near u. Therefore, for all
sufficiently large n, if v has no discontinuities then |v(u)| ≤ C for all u ∈ [u, u], and
so by the preceding argument it follows that v(u) must satisfy the proportionality
relations (41) for all u ∈ [u, u].
7.2 Consequences of Proposition 20
Proposition 20 puts strong constraints on the distribution of the vote total Sn in a
Nash equilibrium. According to this proposition, the approximate proportionality
rule (41) holds for all u ∈ [u, u] except those values u within distance βn−3/2 of one
of the endpoints u, u. Fix β = β() > 0 as in Proposition 20, and call [uβn−3/2 , u] ∪
[u, uβn−3/2 ] the extremist range. Denote by G the event that the sample U1, U2, . . . , Un
contains no values in the extremist range. By Proposition 20, on the event G the
approximate proportionality rule (41) will apply for each agent; furthermore, for
Nash equilibria with no discontinuities, (41) holds for all u ∈ [u, u]. Thus, conditional
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on the event G (or, for continuous Nash equilibria, unconditionally) the random
variables v(Ui) are (at least for sufficiently large n) bounded above and below by
2Eψ(Sn)u and 2Eψ(Sn)u, and so Hoeffding’s inequality applies.
Corollary 21. Let G be the event that the sample Ui contains no values u in the extremist
range. Then for all sufficiently large n and any Nash equilibrium v(u),
P (|Sn − E(Sn|G)| ≥ tEψ(Sn) |G) ≤ exp{−t2/2nEψ(Sn)2(u− u)2}; (43)
and for any Nash equilibrium with no discontinuities,
P (|Sn − ESn| ≥ tEψ(Sn)) ≤ exp{−t2/2nEψ(Sn)2(u− u)2}.
Proposition 20 also implies uniformity in the normal approximation to the dis-
tribution of Sn, because the proportionality rule (41) guarantees that the ratio of
the third moment to the 3/2 power of the variance of v(Ui) is uniformly bounded.
Hence, by the Berry-Esseen theorem, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 22. There exists κ < ∞ such that for all sufficiently large n and any Nash
equilibrium v(u), the vote total Sn satisfies
sup
t∈R
|P (Sn − E(Sn|G) ≤ t
√
var(Sn|G) |G)− Φ(t)| ≤ κn−1/2,
and consequently, since 1− P (G) = O(n−1/2), there exists κ′ <∞ such that
sup
t∈R
|P{Sn − E(Sn|G) ≤ t
√
var(Sn|G)} − Φ(t)| ≤ κ′n−1/2.
Here Φ denotes the standard normal cumulative distribution function.
8 Unbalanced Populations: Proofs of Theorems 2–3
8.1 Concentration of the vote total
Lemma 23. If µ > 0 then for all large n no Nash equilibrium v(u) has a discontinuity at a
nonnegative value of u. Moreover, for any  > 0, if n is sufficiently large then in any Nash
equilibrium the vote total Sn must satisfy
δ −  ≤ ESn ≤ δ + +
√
2 |u|] and (44)
P{|Sn − ESn| > } < . (45)
In addition, for any  > 0 there exists γ > 0 such that if n is sufficiently large and v(u) is
a Nash equilibrium with no discontinuities, then
P{|Sn − ESn| > } < e−γn. (46)
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Proof. By Lemma 16, a Nash equilibrium v(u) can have no discontinuities at dis-
tance greater than Cn−3/2 of one of the endpoints u, u. Agents with such utilities
are designated extremists; if G is the event that the sample U1, U2, . . . , Un contains
no extremists, then
P (Gc) ∼ C(f(u) + f(u))/√n.
Since not even an extremist would ever buy more than max(
√
2 |u|,√2u) votes, it
follows that the extremist contribution to ESn is of size at most O(n−1/2).
By Proposition 20, Nash equilibria v(u) obey the approximate proportionality
rule (41) except in the extremist range. Consequently, if S ′n is the vote total of the
non-extremists among the first n voters, then for any  > 0, if n is large,
Eψ(Sn)µ(1− ) ≤ ES ′n/n ≤ Eψ(Sn)µ(1 + ). (47)
Since µ > 0 and ESn − ES ′n = O(n−1/2), it follows that ESn ≥ C ′n−1/2 for some
C ′ <∞ not depending on n.
Suppose now that ESn < δ − 2′ for some small ′ > 0. Since the constant  > 0
in (47) can be chosen arbitrarily small relative to ′, it follows that nEψ(Sn)µ ≤ δ−′.
But then (47), together with Hoeffding’s inequality (43) and the fact that P (Gc) =
O(n−1/2), implies that−δ/2 ≤ Sn ≤ δ− ′/2 with probability tending to 1 as n→∞.
We would then have
Eψ(Sn) ≥ (1− ) min
v∈[−δ/2,δ−′/2]
ψ(v).
(Recall that ψ is bounded away from 0 on any compact sub-interval of (−δ, δ). This,
however, would contradict the hypothesis that nEψ(Sn) < δ − ′/2. This proves
that for any  > 0, if n is sufficiently large then in any Nash equilibrium,
ESn ≥ δ − .
Next, suppose that ESn > δ +
√
2 |u|+ 4′ for some ′ > 0. The proportionality
rule (41) (applied with some  > 0 small relative to ′) then implies that nEψ(Sn) >
δ +
√
2 |u|+ 3′, provided n is large. Hence, by the Hoeffding inequality (43), there
exists γ = γ(′) > 0 such that
P (Sn ≤ δ +
√
2 |u|+ ′ |G) ≤ e−γn,
because on the event Sn ≤ δ +
√
2 |u| the sum Sn must deviate from its expectation
by more than nEψ(Sn)′. Hence, for all v ≥ −
√
2 |u|,
Eψ(v + Sn) ≤ e−γn‖ψ‖∞ + P (Gc)‖ψ‖∞.
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Thus, v(u) must be vanishingly small (of order no greater than O(n−1/2)) for all
u ∈ [u, u], and so by Lemma 16 the function v(·) can have no discontinuities in [u, u].
But then the proportionality rule (41) would hold for all u ∈ [u, u], and so another
application of Hoeffding’s inequality implies
P (Sn ≤ δ +
√
2 |u|) ≤ e−γn =⇒ Eψ(Sn) ≤ e−γn‖ψ‖∞,
which contradicts Lemma 9. This proves that for every  > 0, if n is sufficiently
large then for every Nash equilibrium,
ESn ≤ δ +
√
2 |u|+ ,
thus establishing assertion (44).
Because ESn is now bounded away from 0 and ∞, it follows as before that
nEψ(Sn) is bounded away from 0 and∞, and so the proportionality rule (41) im-
plies the conditional variance of Sn given the event G is O(n−1). The assertion (45)
therefore follows from Chebyshev’s inequality and the bound P (Gc) = O(n−1/2).
Given (44) and (45), we can now conclude that there can be no discontinuities at
nonnegative values of u, because in view of Lemma 16, the monotonicity of Nash
equilibria, and the necessary condition (19), such discontinuities would entail that
Eψ(v(u) + Sn)u ≥ 2∆,
which is incompatible with (44) and (45), because for small  > 0 the function ψ(w)
is uniformly small for w ≥ δ − 2.
Finally, if v is a Nash equilibrium with no discontinuities then Corollary 21
implies the exponential bound (46).
8.2 Identification of the concentration point
Lemma 24. Assume that µ > 0, and let (α,w) be the solution of the Optimization Problem
(cf. section 1.4.2), if one exists, or let α = δ if not. Then for any  > 0, if n is sufficiently
large then in every Nash equilibrium,∣∣∣∣12Eψ(Sn)− αµ−1
∣∣∣∣ < . (48)
Proof. The lemma is equivalent to the assertion that |ESn − α| → 0, by the pro-
portionality rule (41). We will prove this in two steps, by first showing that for
sufficiently large n the expectation ESn cannot be smaller than α−3, and then that
it cannot be larger than α + 3.
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If α = δ then Lemma 23 implies that ESn < α −  is impossible for large n, so
to prove that ESn ≥ α− 3δ for large n it suffices to consider the case where α > δ.
Suppose that ESn < α − 3, where  > 0 is small enough that α − 4 > δ; then by
Lemma 23,
P{δ ≤ Sn ≤ α− 2} −→ 1 as n→∞.
But since (α,w) satisfies (16), for all sufficiently small ′ > 0 we must have
(1−Ψ(w))|u| > (α− − w)2
for all u in a neighborhood [u, u + %], where % > 0. Hence, a voter with value u
in this neighborhood could with probability near 1, improve her expected utility
payoff from u to Ψ(w)u, at a cost of (α− −w)2, and so all such voters would defect
from the equilibrium strategy. This is a contradiction; hence, we conclude that for
all large n, in any equilibrium, ESn ≥ α− 3.
Now suppose that ESn > α+ 3. Then by Lemma 23, the one-out vote total Sn
would exceed α− 2 with probability near 1, for large n. But by (16), for all w ≤ δ,
(α + 2− w)2 ≥ 42 + (1−Ψ(w))|u|,
so it would be sub-optimal for a voter with value u = u to buy more than ∆/2 neg-
ative votes, where ∆ is the discontinuity threshold. Thus, by Lemmas 16 and 23, all
Nash equilibria are continuous when n is sufficiently large. But then assertion (46)
would imply
P{Sn ≤ α− 2} < e−%n
which in turn would ensure that
Eψ(Sn) ≤ ‖ψ‖∞e−%n.
This is impossible, because the proportionality rule (41) would then imply that for
some constant C < ∞ not depending on n or the particular equilibrium, ‖v‖∞ ≤
Ce−%n, contradicting Lemma 9.
8.3 Proof of Theorem 2
Proof of assertion (12). The asymptotic efficiency of quadratic voting in the unbal-
anced case µ > 0 is a direct and easy consequence of Lemma 23. This implies that
for any  > 0, the probability that the vote total SN = Sn + v(Un+1) will fall below
δ− 2 is less than  for all large n, and so by the continuity of the payoff function Ψ,
for any  > 0
P{Ψ(SN) ≤ 1− } < 
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for all sufficiently large N and all Nash equilibria. Moreover, the law of large
numbers guarantees that for large N ,
P
{|N−1U − µ| ≥ } <  where U := N∑
i=1
Ui.
Because the random variables U and Ψ(SN) are bounded, it therefore follows that
for any  > 0, if N is sufficiently large then in any equilibrium∣∣∣∣E[UΨ(SN)]2E|U | − 1
∣∣∣∣ < .
Proof of assertions (13)–(14). The second assertion (14) will follow immediately from
the first, by the law of large numbers for the sequence U1, U2, . . . , and the asser-
tion (14) will follow directly from the approximate proportionality rule (41) and
Lemma 24.
8.4 Proof of Theorem 3
Assume now that µ > 0 and that the Optimization Problem (16) has a unique
solution (α,w). We will first prove that for large n, every Nash equilibrium has a
discontinuity u∗ near u, and then we will argue that this discontinuity must occur
very near u + ζn−2 for a constant ζ > 0 depending only on the payoff function Ψ
and the sampling distribution F .
We have shown, in Lemma 24, that for any  > 0, every Nash equilibrium must
satisfy |ESn − α| <  when n is sufficiently large. In addition, we have shown in
Lemma 23 that if n is large and v(u) is a Nash equilibrium with no discontinuities,
then P{|Sn − ESn| > } decays exponentially fast in n. Because α > δ, we may
choose  > 0 so small that α − 3 > δ. It then follows that for a suitable constant
γ > 0, if n is large and v(u) is a Nash equilibrium with no discontinuities, then
P{Sn ≤ δ} ≤ e−γn.
But as in the proof of Lemma 24, this would imply that Eψ(Sn) decays exponen-
tially with n, which is impossible in view of the proportionality rule and Lemma 9.
Therefore, for large n every Nash equilibrium v(u) has a discontinuity. Lemma 23
asserts that there are no discontinuities at points u ∈ [0, u], so any discontinuity
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must be located in [u, 0). Lemma 16 implies any such discontinuity must occur at a
point within distance O(n−3/2) of u.
Let v(u) be a Nash equilibrium, and let u∗ be the rightmost point of discontinuity
of v. By Lemma 16, the size of any discontinuity is at least ∆, so v(u) < −∆ for
every u < u∗. Obviously, the expected payoff for an agent with utility umust exceed
the expected payoff under the alternative strategy of buying no votes. The latter
expectation is approximately u, because Sn is highly concentrated near ESn > α− 
and so EΨ(Sn) ≈ 1. On the other hand, the expected payoff at u < u∗ for an agent
playing the Nash strategy is approximately
Ψ(α− v(u)) (u)− v(u)2,
an improvement over the alternative strategy of buying no votes of about
(1−Ψ(α− v(u))|u| − v(u)2.
In order that this difference be nonnegative, it must be the case that |v(u)| ≈ α −
w, because by hypothesis, (α,w) is the unique pair such that relations (11) hold.
Because this approximation is valid for all u ∈ [u, u∗), it follows by Lemma 16
that v(u) cannot have another discontinuity in the interval [u, u∗). This also proves
assertion (ii) of Theorem 3, that
v(u) = −(α− w).
Because u∗ must be within distanceCn−3/2 of u, the probability that an extremist
exists in the sample U1, U2, . . . , Un is of order nf(u)(u∗ − u) = O(n−1/2), and the
conditional probability that more than one extremist exists given that at least one
does is of order O(n−1/2). Consequently, because the distribution of Sn is highly
concentrated near α (cf. Lemma 23), where ψ = 0, the major contribution to the
expectation Eψ(Sn) comes from samples with exactly one extremist; hence,
Eψ(Sn + v(u)) ≈ nψ(w)f (u) (u∗ + |u|) +O(n−1/2(u∗ + |u|)).
On the other hand, becauseESn ≈ α, the proportionality rule (41) implies nEψ(Sn) ≈
α, and so
n2µψ(w)f (u) (u∗ + |u|) ≈ α =⇒
u∗ − u ∼ ζn−2,
where ζ is the unique solution of the equation α = ζψ(w)f (u).
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9 Balanced Populations: Proof of Theorem 1
9.1 Continuity of Nash equilibria
Proposition 25. If µ = 0, then for all sufficiently large values of n no Nash equilibrium
v(u) has a discontinuity in [u, u]. Moreover, for any  > 0, if n is sufficiently large every
Nash equilibrium v(u) satisfies
‖v‖∞ ≤ . (49)
Proof. The size of any discontinuity is bounded below by a positive constant ∆, by
Lemma 16, so it suffices to prove the assertion (49). Fix  > 0, and suppose that in
some Nash equilibrium there is a value u∗ ∈ [u, u] (necessarily in the extremist range
[u, u]\[uβn−3/2 , uβn−3/2 ], by Lemma 14) such that |v(u∗)| ≥ ; thenEψ(v(u∗)+Sn)|u| ≥
2, by the necessary condition (19), and so
P{Sn + v(u∗) ∈ [−δ, δ]} ≥ 2‖ψ‖∞max (|u| , u) . (50)
We will show that if n is large then this leads to a contradiction. Assume for
convenience that v(u∗) > 0 (and hence that u∗ ≥ uβn−3/2 , where β = β() is as in
Lemma 14); the case v(u∗) < 0 can be argued in similar fashion.
By Proposition 12, there exists γ = γ() > 0 such that if n is sufficiently large
then any Nash equilibrium v(u) satisfying ‖v‖∞ > must also satisfy |v(u)| ≤ γ/
√
n
for all u not within distance  of one of the endpoints u, u. Hence, the approximate
proportionality relation (41) implies
Eψ(Sn) ≤ C√
n
(51)
for a suitable C = C(γ) < ∞ independent of n. It now follows that v(u∗) ≥ δ/2,
since otherwise (50) would be incompatible with (51). Moreover, the relation (41)
holds for all u not within distance βn−3/2 of one of the endpoints, so for some
C ′ < 2C
|v(u)| ≤ C ′/√n for all u ∈ [uβn−3/2 , uβn−3/2 ] (52)
consequently,
var(Sn |G) ≤ (2C)2EU21 := C ′′
where G is the event that the sample U1, U2, . . . , Un contains no extremists (voters
with values within distance βn−3/2 of {u, u}).
Recall that the Berry-Essen theorem (cf. Corollary 22) implies that
|P{Sn − E(Sn|G) ≤ t
√
var(Sn|G)} − Φ(t)| ≤ κn−1/2 for all t ∈ R.
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Therefore, in order that inequality (50) hold, it must be that for a suitable constant
C ′′′ <∞ independent of n,
|v(u)− E(Sn|G)| ≤ C ′′′
√
var(Sn|G),
and hence, since var(Sn|G) remains bounded as n → ∞, so must the conditional
expectation E(Sn|G). To complete the proof, we will show that if µ = 0 then
var(Sn|G) must remain bounded below by a positive constant independent of n; the
Berry-Esseen bound will then imply that P{Sn ∈ [−δ/2, δ/2]} remains bounded
below, which in turn implies that Eψ(Sn) is bounded below, in contradiction to
(51).
To show that var(Sn|G) remains bounded below we use the necessary condi-
tion (19) and Taylor’s theorem to obtain
2v(u) = Eψ(Sn)u+ Eψ
′(Sn)v(u)u
+
1
2
Eψ′′(Sn)v(u)2u+
1
6
Eψ′′′(Sn + v˜(u))v(u)3u
for some v˜(u) intermediate between 0 and v(u). Since Eψ(Sn) = O(n−1/2), by (51),
Lemma 18 implies that bothEψ′(Sn) andEψ′′(Sn) are bounded by constants n → 0.
Since |v(u)| ≤ C ′/√n for all u not within distance βn−3/2 of the endpoints, it follows
that for all such u,
2v(u) = Eψ(Sn)u+ Eψ
′(Sn)v(u)u+Rn(u)
= Eψ(Sn)u+
1
2
Eψ′(Sn)Eψ(Sn)u2 +R∗n(u) (53)
where |R∗n(u)| ≤ 2n/n. Using the hypothesis that µ = 0 and the fact that P (G) =
O(n−1/2), we infer that for some sequence ′n → 0
|2E(Sn|G)− n
2
Eψ′(Sn)Eψ(Sn)σ2| ≤ ′n and
|var(Sn|G)− n
4
(Eψ(Sn))
2| ≤ ′n.
Fix α > 0 small, and suppose that
√
nEψ(Sn) < α. Since E(Sn|G) > δ/2,
we would then have
√
nEψ′(Sn) > δ/α for all sufficiently large n. Now by our
standing model assumptions (2)–(5), the function ψ′ is odd and positive on (−δ, 0),
so in order that
√
nEψ′(Sn) > δ/α we must have
P (Sn < 0) ≥ δ/(α‖ψ′‖∞
√
n).
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But by Hoeffding’s inequality (cf. Corollary 21), for all large n,
P (Sn < 0) ≤ P (Gc) + P (|Sn − E(Sn|G)| > δ/2)
≤ β′/√n+ P (|Sn − E(Sn|G)| >
√
nδEψ(Sn)/2α|G)
≤ β′/√n+ exp{−nδ2/2(u− u)2},
where β′ = 2β(f(u) + f(u)). Now β = β() is fixed, so if α > 0 is sufficiently small
then the opposing inequalities for P (Sn < 0) are incompatible. Thus, there exists
some constant α > 0 such that var(Sn|G) ≥ α for all large n.
Because ‖v‖∞ is small for any Nash equilibrium v, the distribution of the vote
total Sn cannot be too highly concentrated. This in turn implies the proportionality
constant Eψ(Sn) in (41) cannot be too small.
Lemma 26. For any C < ∞ a nC < ∞ exists such that for all n ≥ nC and every Nash
equilibrium,
nEψ(Sn) ≥ C. (54)
Proof. By the approximate proportionality rule (41) and the necessary condition (19),
for any  > 0 and all sufficiently large n,
|ESn| ≤ nEψ(Sn)E|U |.
Thus, by Hoeffding’s inequality (Corollary 21), if nEψ(Sn) < C then the distribu-
tion of Sn must be highly concentrated in a neighborhood of 0. But if this were so
we would have, for all large n,
Eψ(Sn) ≈ ψ(0) > 0,
which is a contradiction.
9.2 Edgeworth expansions
For the analysis of the case µU = 0 refined estimates of the errors in the approximate
proportionality rule (41) will be necessary. We derive these from the Edgeworth
expansion for the density of a sum of independent, identically distributed random
variables (cf. [3], Ch. XVI, sec. 2, Th. 2). The relevant summands here are the
random variables v(Ui), and because the function v(u) depends on the particular
Nash equilibrium (and hence also on n), we must employ a version of the Edge-
worth expansion in which the error is precisely quantified. The following variant of
Feller’s Theorem 2 (which can be proved in the same manner as in [3]) will suffice
for our purposes.
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Proposition 27. Let Y1, Y2, . . . , Yn be independent, identically distributed random vari-
ables with mean EY1 = 0, variance EY 21 = 1, and finite 2rth moment E|Y1|2r = µ2r ≤
m2r. Assume the distribution of Y1 has a density f1(y) whose Fourier transform fˆ1 satisfies
|fˆ1(θ)| ≤ g(θ), where g is a C2r function such that g ∈ Lν for some ν ≥ 1 and such that
for every  > 0,
sup
|θ|≥
g(θ) < 1. (55)
Then for some sequence n → 0 depending only on m2r and on the function g, the density
fn(y) of
∑n
i=1 Yi/
√
n satisfies∣∣∣∣fn(x)− e−x2/2√2pin
(
1 +
2r∑
k=3
n−(k−2)/2Pk(x)
)∣∣∣∣ ≤ nn−r+1 (56)
for all x ∈ R, where Pk(x) = CkHk(x) is a multiple of the kth Hermite polynomial Hk(x),
and Ck is a continuous function of the moments µ3, µ4, . . . , µk of Y1.
The following lemma ensures that in any Nash equilibrium the sums Sn =∑n
i=1 v(Ui), after suitable renormalization, meet the requirements of Proposition 27.
Lemma 28. There exist constants 0 < σ1 < σ2 < m2r <∞ and a function g(θ) satisfying
the hypotheses of Proposition 27 (with r = 4) such that for all sufficiently large n and any
Nash equilibrium v(u) the following statement holds. If w(u) = 2v(u)/Eψ(Sn)
(a) σ21 < var(w(Ui)) < σ22 ;
(b) E|w(Ui)− Ew(Ui)|2r ≤ m2r; and
(c) the random variables w(Ui) have density fW (w) whose Fourier transform is bounded
in absolute value by g.
Proof. These statements are consequences of the proportionality relations (41) and
the smoothness of Nash equilibria. By Proposition 25, Nash equilibria are contin-
uous on [u, u] and for large n satisfy ‖v‖∞ < , where  > 0 is any small constant.
Consequently, by Proposition 20, the proportionality relations (41) hold on the en-
tire interval [u, u]. Because EU1 = 0, it follows that for any  > 0, if n is sufficiently
large then |Ew(Ui)| < , and so assertions (a)–(b) follow routinely from (41).
The existence of the density fW (w) follows from the smoothness of Nash equi-
libria, which was established in Subsection 6.2. In particular, by Lemma 19, inequal-
ities (40), and the proportionality relations (41), if the sample size n is sufficiently
large and v is any continuous Nash equilibrium then v is twice continuously dif-
ferentiable on [u, u], and constants α, β > 0 exist not depending on n or on the
particular Nash equilibrium such that the derivatives satisfy
α ≤ v
′(u)
Eψ(Sn)
≤ α−1 and β ≤ v
′′(u)
Eψ(Sn)
≤ β−1 (57)
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for all u ∈ [u, u]. Consequently, if U is a random variable with density f(u) the
random variable W := 2v(U)/Eψ(Sn) has density
fW (w) = f(u)Eψ(Sn)/(2v
′(u)) where w = 2v(u)/Eψ(Sn). (58)
Furthermore, since by Lemma 25 ‖v‖∞ and therefore alsoEψ(Sn) are small, Lemma 19
and inequalities (40), together with the proportionality relations (41), imply that
the density fW (w) is continuously differentiable, and its derivative
f ′W (w) =
f ′(u)(Eψ(Sn))2
4v′(u)2
− f(u)(Eψ(Sn))
2v′′(u)
4v′(u)3
satisfies
|f ′W (w)| ≤ κ (59)
where κ < ∞ is a constant that does not depend on either n or on the choice of
Nash equilibrium.
The last step is to prove the existence of a dominating function g(θ) for the
Fourier transform of fW . We do this in three pieces: (i) for values |θ| ≤ γ, where
γ > 0 is a small fixed constant; (ii) for values |θ| ≥ K, where K is a large but fixed
constant; and (iii) for γ < |θ| < K. Region (i) is easily dealt with, in view of the
bounds (a)–(b) on the second and third moments and the estimate |Ew(U)| < ′, as
these together with Taylor’s theorem imply that for all |θ| < 1,
|fˆW (θ)− (1 + iθEw(U)− θ2var(w(U))/2| ≤ m3|θ|3.
Next consider region (ii), where |θ| is large. Integration by parts shows that
fˆW (θ) =
ˆ w(u)
w(u)
fW (w)e
iθw dw = −
ˆ w(u)
w(u)
eiθw
iθ
f ′W (w) dw +
eiθw
iθ
fW (w)
∣∣∣∣w(u)
wu
;
because fW (w) is uniformly bounded at w(u) and w(u), by (57) and (58), and be-
cause |f ′W (w)| ≤ κ, by (59), it follows that there is a constant C < ∞ such that for
all sufficiently large n and all Nash equilibria,
|fˆW (θ)| ≤ C/|θ| ∀ θ 6= 0.
Thus, setting g(θ) = C/|θ| for all |θ| ≥ 2C, we have a uniform bound for the Fourier
transforms fˆW (θ) in the region (ii).
Finally, to bound |fˆW (θ)| in the region (iii) of intermediate θ−values, we use the
proportionality rule once again in the form |w(u) − u| < , valid for all u ∈ [u, u].
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This implies
fˆW (θ) =
ˆ u
u
eiθw(u)f(u) du
=
ˆ u
u
eiθuf(u) du+
ˆ u
u
(eiθw(u) − eiθu)f(u) du
= fˆU(θ) +R(θ)
where |R(θ)| < ′ uniformly for |θ| ≤ C and ′ → 0 as  → 0. Because fˆU is
the Fourier transform of an absolutely continuous probability density, its absolute
value is bounded away from 1 on the complement of [−γ, γ], for any γ > 0. Since
 > 0 can be made arbitrarily small (cf. Proposition 20), it follows that a continuous,
positive function g(θ) that is bounded away from 1 on |θ| ∈ [γ, C] exists such that
|fˆW )θ| ≤ g(θ) for all |θ| ∈ [γ, C]. The extension of g to the whole real line can now
be done by smoothly interpolating at the boundaries of regions (i), (ii), and (iii).
9.3 Proof of Theorem 1
Because the function ψ is smooth and has compact support, differentiation under
the expectation in the necessary condition 2v(u) = Eψ(v(u) + Sn)u is permissible,
and so for every u ∈ [−u, u] a v˜(u) exists intermediate between 0 and v(u) such that
2v(u) = Eψ(Sn)u+ Eψ
′(Sn + v˜(u))v(u)u. (60)
The proof of Theorem 1 will hinge on the use of the Edgeworth expansion (Propo-
sition 27) to approximate each of the two expectations in (60) precisely.
As in Lemma 28, let w(u) = 2v(u)/Eψ(Sn). We have already observed, in the
proof of Lemma 28, that for any  > 0, if n is sufficiently large then for any Nash
equilibrium, |Ew(U)| < . It therefore follows from the proportionality rule that∣∣∣∣ 4 var(v(U))(Eψ(Sn))2σ2U − 1
∣∣∣∣ ≤  and ∣∣∣∣E|v(u)− Ev(u)|k(Eψ(Sn))kE|U |k
∣∣∣∣ <  ∀ k ≤ 8. (61)
Moreover, Lemma 28 and Proposition 27 imply the distribution of Sn has a density
with an Edgeworth expansion, and so for any continuous function ϕ : [−δ, δ]→ R,
Eϕ(Sn) =
ˆ δ
−δ
ϕ(x)
e−y
2/2
√
2pinσV
(
1 +
m∑
k=3
n−(k−2)/2Pk(y)
)
dx+ rn(ϕ) (62)
where
σ2V := var(v(U)),
y = y(x) = (x− ESn)/
√
var(Sn),
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and Pk(y) = CkH3(y) is a multiple of the kth Hermite polynomial. The constants
Ck depend only on the first k moments of w(U), and consequently are uniformly
bounded by constants C ′k not depending on n or on the choice of Nash equilibrium.
The error term rn(ϕ) satisfies
|rn(ϕ)| ≤ n
n(m−2)/2
ˆ δ
−δ
|ϕ(x)|√
2pivar(Sn)
dx. (63)
In the special case ϕ = ψ, (62) and the remainder estimate (63) (with m = 4) imply
Eψ(Sn) ≤ 1√
2pinσV
ˆ δ
−δ
ψ(x) dx+ o(n−1σ−1V ).
Because 4σ2V ≈ (Eψ(Sn))2σ2U for large n, this implies that for a suitable constant
κ <∞,
Eψ(Sn) ≤ κ4√n. (64)
Claim 29. There exist constants αn →∞ such that in every Nash equilibrium,
|ESn| ≤ α−1n
√
var(Sn) and (65)
var(Sn) ≥ α2n. (66)
Proof of Theorem 1: Conclusion. Before we begin the proof of the claim, we indicate
how it will imply Theorem 1. If (65) and (66) hold, then for every x ∈ [−δ, δ],
|y(x)| ≤ (1 + 2δ)/αn → 0.
Consequently, the dominant term in the Edgeworth expansion (62) for ϕ = ψ (with
m = 4), is the first, and so for any  > 0, if n is sufficiently large,
Eψ(Sn) =
1√
2pinσV
ˆ δ
−δ
ψ(x) dx(1± ).
(Here the notation (1 ± ) means the ratio of the two sides is bounded above and
below by (1± ).) Thus 4σ2V ≈ (Eψ(Sn))2σ2U implies√
pin/2σU(Eψ(Sn))
2 =
ˆ δ
−δ
ψ(x) dx(1± ) = 2± 2,
proving the assertion (10).
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Proof of Claim 29. First we deal with the remainder term rn(ϕ) in the Edgeworth
expansion (62). By Lemma 26, the expectation Eψ(Sn) is at least C/n for large n,
and so by (61) the variance of Sn must be at least C ′/n. Consequently, by (63), the
remainder term rn(ϕ) in (62) satisfies
|rn(ϕ)| ≤ C ′′ n‖ϕ‖1
n(m−2)/2
√
var(Sn)
≤ C ′′′ n‖ϕ‖1
n(m−3)/2
.
Suitable choice ofmwill make this bound small compared to any desired monomial
n−A, and so we may ignore the remainder term in the arguments to follow.
Suppose there were a constant C < ∞ such that along some sequence n → ∞
Nash equilibria existed satisfying var(Sn) ≤ C. By (61), this would force C/n ≤
Eψ(Sn) ≤ C ′/
√
n, which in turn would imply that
C ′′var(Sn) log n ≥ |ESn|2 ≥ C ′′′var(Sn) log n, (67)
because otherwise the dominant term in the Edgeworth series for Eψ(Sn) would be
either too large or too small asymptotically (along the sequence n→∞) to match
the requirement that C/n ≤ Eψ(Sn) ≤ C ′/
√
n. (Observe that because the ratio
|ESn|2/var(Sn) is bounded above by C ′′ log n, the terms e−y2/2Pk(y) in the integral
(62) are of size at most (log n)A for some A depending on m, and so the first term in
the Edgeworth series is dominant.) We will show that (67) leads to a contradiction.
Suppose ESn > 0 (the case ESn < 0 is similar). The Taylor expansion (60) for
v(u) and the hypothesis EU = 0 implies
2Ev(U) = Eψ′(Sn + v˜(U))v(U)U. (68)
The Edgeworth expansion (62) for Eψ′(Sn + v˜(u)) together with the independence
of Sn and U and the inequalities (67), implies that for any  > 0, if n is sufficiently
large then
Eψ′(Sn + v˜(u))
=
1√
2pivar(Sn)
ˆ δ
−δ
ψ′(x) exp{−(x+ v˜(u)− ESn)2/2var(Sn)} dx(1± ). (69)
Now because ψ and ψ′ have support [−δ, δ], integration by parts yields
ˆ δ
−δ
ψ′(x) exp{−(x+ v˜(u)− ESn)2/2var(Sn)} dx
=
ˆ δ
−δ
ψ(x) exp{−(x+ v˜(u)− ESn)2/2var(Sn)}x+ v˜(u)− ESnvar(Sn) dx, (70)
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and because x+ v˜(u) is of smaller order of magnitude than ESn, it follows that for
large n
Eψ′(Sn + v˜(u)) = − ESnvar(Sn)Eψ(Sn)(1± ). (71)
But it now follows from the Taylor series for 2Ev(Ui) (by summing over i) that
2ESn = −n ESnvar(Sn)Eψ(Sn)Ev(U)U(1± ), (72)
which is a contradiction, because the right side is negative and the left side positive.
This proves the assertion (66).
The proof of inequality (65) is similar. Suppose for some C > 0 Nash equilibria
existed along a sequence n → ∞ for which ESn ≥ C
√
var(Sn). In view of (66),
this hypothesis implies in particular that ESn → ∞, and also that |y(x)| ≥ C/2
for all x ∈ [−δ, δ]. Thus, the Edgeworth approximation (69) remains valid, as does
the integration by parts identity (70). Because ESn → ∞, the terms x + v˜(u) are
of smaller order of magnitude that ESn, and so once again (71) and therefore (72)
follow. Again we have a contradiction, because the right side of (72) is negative
while the left side diverges to +∞.
10 Proof of Proposition 2
We shall assume throughout that δ < 1/
√
2, and that the function ψ = Ψ′ satisfies
the standing assumptions of section 1.1. Thus, ψ/2 is an even, C∞ probability
density with support [−δ, δ]; it has positive derivative ψ′ on (−δ, 0) (and hence
negative derivative on (0, δ)); and it has a single point of inflection in the interval
(−δ, 0).
Define
H(α,w) = (1−Ψ(w))|u| − (α− w)2. (73)
Proposition 2 asserts that, under the assumption δ < 1/
√
2, there is a unique value
α > δ such that (i) the maximum value of the function w 7→ H(α,w) on w ∈ R is 0,
and (ii) this maximum is attained at precisely two values of w, one at w = α, the
other at a point w ∈ (−δ, δ). Local maxima and minima of smooth functions are
attained only at critical points, that is, roots of the equation
∂H
∂w
(α,w) = −ψ(w)|u|+ 2(α− w) = 0. (74)
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Figure 1: Possible configurations of the optimization problem faced by individuals with
extreme negative utilities depending on the size of δ.
Lemma 30. There exists A ∈ (δ,∞) such that
(i) α > A =⇒ a unique critical point exists at w = α;
(ii) α = A =⇒ 2 critical points exist, at w = α and at w∗ ∈ (−δ, δ); and
(iii) δ ≤ α < A =⇒ 3 critical points exist, atw = α and at distinct pointsw−(α), w+(α) ∈
(−δ, δ).
For α ∈ [δ, A) the two critical points w−(α) < w+(α) vary continuously with α; the
function w−(α) is increasing in α, while w+(α) is decreasing. Moreover, as α→ A−, the
critical points w±(α)→ w∗.
The basic idea can be seen clearly graphically, as shown in Figure 1, which
pictures the different arrangements that are possible.
Proof. It is clear that for every α ≥ δ the equation (74) holds at w = α, because
ψ = 0 outside of the interval (−δ, δ). All other critical points are points where the
straight line of slope −2 through (α, 0) intersects the graph of y = |u|ψ(w). Because
ψ(w) 6= 0 only for w ∈ (−δ, δ), critical points not equal to α must be located in the
interval (−δ, δ).
(1) We first show that for α ≥ δ near δ at least two such intersection points exist,
one in each of the intervals (−δ, 0) and (0, δ). To see this, observe that because ψ/2
is a probability density with support (−δ, δ) ⊂ (−1/√2, 1/√2), its maximum value,
which is assumed at w = 0, must exceed 1/
√
2, and so ψ(0) >
√
2. But the line
y = 2(δ − w) intersects the y−axis at y = 2δ < √2, so it must cross the graph of
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y = |u|ψ(w) at least once in each of the intervals (0, δ) and (−δ, 0). Similarly, if α− δ
is sufficiently small then the line y = 2(α−w) must also cross the graph twice, once
on each side of 0.
(2) Next, we show that for any α ≥ δ at most two roots of (74) in (−δ, δ) exist,
and that two exist if and only if both intersections are transversal. Assume at least
two distinct roots exist; let w+(α) ∈ (0, δ) be the largest, and let w−(α) be the second
largest. We claim that at w = w+(α) the intersection between the line y = 2(δ − w)
and the graph of y = |u|ψ(w) is transversal, that is,
|u|ψ′(w) 6= −2. (75)
It is impossible for |u|ψ′(w+(α)) > −2, because 2(δ − w) > |u|ψ(w) for all w+(α) <
w < α, so we must only show that the line y = 2(δ − w) cannot be tangent to the
graph at w = w+(α). But if this were the case then |u|ψ′′(w+(α)) < 0, once again
because the line lies above the graph in the interval w+(α) < w < α; because ψ has
only a single inflection point in (0, δ), it would then follow that w+(α) is the only
root of (74) in (−δ, δ), contrary to our hypothesis. This proves (75) for w = w+(α).
It now follows from (75) that the intersection between the line y = 2(δ − w) and
the graph of y = |u|ψ(w) at w−(α) is also transversal. To see this, note first that
it suffices to consider the case where w−(α) > 0, because at any w ∈ (−δ, 0] the
slope of the graph of |u|ψ(w) is nonnegative. Next, observe that by the Mean Value
Theorem a maximal w∗ ∈ [w−(α), w+(α)] at which |u|ψ′(w∗) = −2 exists. This point
w∗ cannot be w+(α), because at w = w+(α) we have (75); furthermore, because
|u|ψ′(w+(α)) < −2, it must be the case that
|u|ψ′(w) < −2 for all w ∈ (w∗, w+(α)),
and so by the Fundamental Theorem of calculus,
|u|ψ(w∗) > 2(δ − w∗).
This implies w∗ > w−(α). Now because the slope of the graph at w∗ is larger than at
w+(α), the second derivative |u|ψ′′(w) must be negative at all 0 < w ≤ w∗, because
of the standing hypothesis that ψ has only one inflection point in (0, δ). Finally,
because 0 < w−(α) < w∗, it follows that
|u|ψ′(w−(α)) < |u|ψ′(w∗) = −2.
Thus, both intersections, at w = w−(α) and w = w+(α), are transversal provided
w−(α) < w+(α).
To complete the proof that at most two roots of (74) in (−δ, δ) exist, consider
the cases w−(α) > 0 and w−(α) ≤ 0 separately. In the first case, the intersection
43
at w−(α) is transversal, and |u|ψ′(w) < −2 at all w ∈ [0, w−(α)]. Hence, the line
y = 2(δ − w) is above the graph of y = |u|ψ(w) at w = 0, and because the line
has constant negative slope, it must remain above the graph at all w < 0, because
w = 0 is the unique point where ψ(w) attains its maximum. Thus, there can be no
points of intersection to the left of w−(α). The second case, where w−(α) ≤ 0, is
even easier: because ψ is increasing on (−δ, 0], for any w < w−(α) we must have
|u|ψ(w) < |u|ψ(w−(α)) = 2(α− w−(α)) < 2(α− w),
and so once again there can be no no points of intersection to the left of w−(α).
(3) Because equation (74) has the formG(α,w) = 0 withG continuously differen-
tiable, the Implicit Function Theorem guarantees that solutions vary continuously
in a neighborhood of any solution where ∂G/∂w 6= 0, i.e., where |u|ψ(w) 6= −2.
We have shown in point (2) above that this is the case for both w±(α), as long as
w+(α) 6= w−(α); thus, w±(α) have continuous extensions to an open interval with
left endpoint δ. We must show that the maximal interval on which the functions w±
can be continuously and monotonically continued is such that at the right endpoint
A the two roots coalesce, and the intersection becomes non-transversal.
Clearly, the linear function 2(α−w) is increasing in α for each w. Consequently,
if A > δ is any point where the line y = 2(A − w) intersects the graph of |u|ψ(w)
non-transversally at some point w∗, then because this would be the only point of
intersection in [−δ, δ] (by point (2)), the graph would lie entirely below the line and
there would be no solutions to equation (74) with α > A. Thus, to complete the
proof it suffices to establish the following claim.
Claim: The function w−(α) increases continuously up to the smallest α = A such
that w−(α) = w+(α) := w∗, where w∗ is the unique point in (0, δ) at which the graph
of |u|ψ has tangent line of slope −2, and lies entirely below its tangent line.
Proof of the Claim. First, observe that because |u|ψ is increasing on [−δ, 0] and de-
creasing on [0, δ], the function w+(α) is decreasing in α, and w−(α) is increasing as
long as w−(α) ≤ 0. Let α0 = |u|ψ(0)/2; at this value, the line y = 2(α0−w) intersects
the graph of |u|ψ transversally at w = 0. Thus, α0 < A, and the functions w±(α) are
continuous and monotone on [δ, α0], and w+(α0) > 0.
To see that a w∗ at which the graph of |u|ψ has tangent line of slope −2 exists,
observe that the intersections of the line y = 2(α0 − w) with the graph of |u|ψ(w)
are both transversal: at w−(α0) = 0 the slope of the graph is > −2, and at W+(α0)
the slope is < −2. Consequently, by the mean value theorem, there must be a point
w∗ ∈ (0, w+(α0)) at which |u|ψ′(w∗) = −2. The tangent line at this point has the
form y = 2(A−w) for some A > δ. Because the intersection at the point of tangency
is non-transversal, it must be the unique point of intersection of this line with the
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graph, and so it follows that the rest of the graph lies below the line, as claimed.
Hence, the derivative |u|ψ′(w) is non-increasing at w = w∗; because ψ has only one
inflection point in (0, δ), it follows that
|u|ψ′(w) > −2 for all 0 ≤ w < w∗. (76)
For eachw ∈ [0, w∗), the line of slope−2 through the point (w, |u|ψ(w)) intersects
the w−axis at a point α(w) > δ. Clearly, the mapping w 7→ α(w) is continuous, and
by (76) it is also increasing in w, with positive derivative. Furthermore, because
the intersection of this line with the graph of |u|ψ(w) is transversal, there must be a
second point of intersection to the right of w. Thus, by point (2),
w−(α(w)) = w.
This proves that w−(α) is continuous and increasing in α on the interval [α0, A],
where A is defined to the unique point where w−(A) = w∗.
It remains to prove that w+(A) = w∗. Recall that w+ is continuous and decreas-
ing as long as w+ > w∗, because the intersections are transversal at all such points.
By point (2), we cannot have w+(α) = w∗ for any α < A, because at any such α a
distinct second transversal intersection at w−(α) < w∗ exists, while the intersection
at w+(α) = w∗ would be non-transversal. Similarly, we cannot have w+(A) > w∗,
because this intersection would be non-transversal, whereas the intersection at
w∗ = w−(A) would be transversal. Therefore, w+(A) = w−(A) = w∗.
Proof of Proposition 2. First, note that for any α ≥ δ the function w 7→ H(α,w) satis-
fies
lim
w→−∞
H(α,w) = lim
w→+∞
H(α,w) = −∞.
Consequently, for any α ∈ [δ, A] neither of the critical points w = α nor w−(α) can
be a local minimum of w 7→ H(α,w). It is easily verified that if α > δ then w = α is a
local maximum, because Ψ = 1 in a neighborhood of α and so ∂2H/∂w2 = −2 at all
w > δ.
Now consider the behavior ofH(α,w) in a neighborhood ofw = w−(α). Because
δ < 1/
√
2, for all α near δ, we have
H(α,−δ) = (1−Ψ(−δ))|u| − (α + δ)2
= 2|u| − (α + δ)2
≥ 2− (α + δ)2 > 0,
because (α + δ) ≈ 2δ, and so the maximum value of H(α,w) for w ∈ R must be
positive. Because H(α, α) = 0, it follows that the global maximum must be attained
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at one of the other two critical points w±(α), and because w = α is a local maximum,
it must be that w+(α) is a local minimum and w−(α) the global maximum. Thus,
H(α,w−(α)) = maxwH(α,w) for all α ∈ [δ, A] such that H(α,w−(α)) > 0.
Next, observe that for any fixed w ≤ δ the function H(α,w) is decreasing in α.
Hence, h(α) := maxw∈[−δ,δ]H(α,w) is decreasing in α. Because h(α) = H(α,w−(α))
for all α such that H(α,w−(α)) ≥ 0, it follows that h(α) decreases continuously with
α up to the first point α∗ where h(α∗) = 0, if such a point exists. But it cannot be
the case that h(α) > 0 for all α > δ, because clearly the definition (73) of H forces
h(α) → −∞ as α → ∞. Finally, α∗ cannot be larger than A, because for all α < α∗
the global minimum of w 7→ H(α,w) is attained in (−δ, δ), and so at least 2 critical
points exist for every such α.
The point α = α∗ is the unique point where a solution to the Optimization
Problem (16) exists, andw−(α∗) is the unique matching real number in [−δ, δ] where
(11) holds.
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